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NOTES
A SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT
TORTFEASORS
Safeway Stores v. City of Raytown'
English common law allowed contribution among unintentional joint
tortfeasors. 2 Early American common law, however, denied all rights to contri-
bution, based upon a misinterpretation of Merryweather v. Nixan,3 an English
case decided in 1799. Gradually the bar eroded, and by 1971, contribution
rights existed in nine American jurisdictions.4
Contribution rights in Missouri initially were only statutory.' In Missouri
Pacific Railroad v. Whitehead & Kales Co.,' the Missouri Supreme Court
expanded the right by allowing defendants to implead tortfeasors to determine
contribution.7 In the recent case of Safeway Stores v. City of Raytown," the
court held that a joint tortfeasor has a substantive right to contribution that
can be asserted in a separate cause of action.'
John Esler was killed when a vehicle owned by Safeway collided with the
lift from which he was repairing a streetlight.1° Esler's wife brought a wrong-
ful death action against Safeway in federal court. Safeway did not implead
any third party to obtain a joint judgment of liability. Mrs. Esler received a
judgment against Safeway." Safeway filed suit seeking apportionment of lia-
1. 633 S.W.2d 727 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
2. See G. WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE §§ 25-54 (1932);
Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan,
12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 177 (1898).
3. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799); see Reath, supra note 2, at 177.
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 306-07 (4th ed. 1971).
5. Note, Settling Joint Tortfeasor Can Sue for Contribution From Nonsettling Joint
Torifeasor, 46 Mo. L. REV. 886, 888 (1981). As enacted, Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (1978)
(repealed 1983) only allowed contribution after the plaintiff secured a judgment against jointly
sued tortfeasors. See note 127 infra. The statute did not change the common law rule forbidding a
sued tortfeasor from seeking contribution from a joint tortfeasor that the plaintiff had chosen not
to sue.
6. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
7. Id. at 474.
8. 633 S.W.2d 727 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
9. id. at 731.
10. Id. at 728.
11. Esler v. Safeway Stores, 585 F.2d 903, 903 (8th Cir. 1978).
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bility based upon relative fault among the City of Raytown, Contractor's Sup-
ply Co., and Fulton Industries. 12 The trial court dismissed the action, reason-
ing that Safeway could not bring a separate indemnity action against
defendants who were not parties to the original suit.13 Safeway appealed, and
the Missouri Supreme Court reversed."' The court held that Safeway had a
substantive right to contribution that could be asserted independently without
obtaining a single judgment1 5 against all parties.16 The court stated that a
separate action for contribution would not violate the defendants' due process
rights.17
The court justified its holding as an interpretation of Whitehead &
Kales.18 Whitehead & Kales established contribution by impleader in Missouri
between joint tortfeasors"9 based upon relative fault.2 0 The action arose from
Missouri Pacific's attempt to implead Whitehead & Kales21 pursuant to Mis-
souri Rule of Civil Procedure 52.1122 and Missouri Revisted Statutes section
507.080.23 Except for the statutory right to contribution from joint judgment
tortfeasors, the general rule in Missouri had been that no right of contribution
12. The City of Raytown employed Esler, Contractor's Supply Co. leased Esler the lift,
and Fulton Industries manufactured the lift. 633 S.W.2d at 728.
13. Id. at 729. Safeway sought contribution. Contribution, indemnity, and partial indem-
nity are often confused. Contribution refers to distributing the loss among tortfeasors, requiring
each to pay his proportionate share. Indemnity shifts the entire loss, requiring total reimburse-
ment. Safeway, 633 S.W.2d at 729 n.3; see Stephenson v. McClure, 606 S.W.2d 208, 210-11
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980); W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 51, at 310. Partial indemnity is a misnomer
for contribution.
14. 633 S.W.2d at 728.
15. Id. While a joint judgment is not required, common or joint liability to the plaintiff is
necessary. See State ex reL Baldwin v. Gaertner, 613 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Mo. 1981) (en bane);
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 468-69 (Mo. 1978) (en banc);
W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 50, at 309.
16. 633 S.W.2d at 732.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 730. Whitehead & Kales has been said to apply only to actions for negligence.
Comment, Contribution in Missouri-Procedure and Defenses Under the New Rule, 44 Mo. L.
REv. 691, 691 (1979). The action in Safeway was based on the humanitarian doctrine; the gen-
eral negligence count was dropped. 585 F.2d at 904 n.l.
19. Whitehead & Kales applies to joint tortfeasors. Comment, supra note 18, at 692. Joint
tortfeasors are parties causing wrongful acts that are separate and distinct but concur in time and
directly cause a single injury. Mails v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 51 F. Supp. 562, 564 (W.D.
Mo. 1943).
20. Controversy exists over whether the phrases "relative fault" and "joint and several
liability" can be used consistently. Relative fault distributes the liability among defendants, andjoint and several liability allows the plaintiff to collect any or all of the judgment from one defen-
dant. Parks v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d 188, 197-201 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (Welliver,
J., dissenting).
21. Whitehead & Kales manufactured and installed the auto rack from which the plaintiff
fell. 566 S.W.2d at 467.
22. Rule 52.11(a) adopts FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) ("defending party, as a third-party plain-
tiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who
is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him"). See State ex ref.
Green v. Kimberlin, 517 S.W.2d 124, 126-27 & n.l (Mo. 1974) (en banc) (allowed defendant to
implead a person not a party to the action who "is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him").
23. (1969) (third-party practice).
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existed among parties of equal fault.2 The trial court dismissed Missouri Pa-
cific's third party petition,28 thereby precluding a joint judgment against Mis-
souri Pacific and Whitehead & Kales, and preventing any opportunity for
Missouri Pacific to obtain contribution under the statute. The court of appeals
affirmed. 26 The court reasoned that Missouri Pacific was not entitled to indem-
nity or contribution because Missouri law27 prevented an "actively" negligent
party from seeking indemnity.28
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the active-passive
distinction had no logical basis.29 Based upon fairness and the need for pre-
dictability, the court held that damages should be apportioned based on rela-
tive fault.30 The court permitted the original defendant to implead a third
party for apportionment of liability3' and thereby granted a procedural, and
possibly substantive, right to contribution.3 2
According to the Safeway court, Whitehead & Kales implicitly author-
ized an independent action for contribution33 because it granted the procedural
24. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (1978) ("Defendants in a judgment founded on an
action for the redress of a private wrong shall be subject to contribution."). The statute requires a
"joint judgment" before.contribution can be obtained. See Allen v. United States, 370 F. Supp.
992, 1009 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Mo. 1961) (en banc). It
was recently changed to clarify the effect of releases on claimants and joint tortfeasors. 1983 Mo.
Legis. Serv. 398-99 (West) (codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (Supp. 1983)).
25. 566 S.W.2d at 467.
26. Id. Missouri Pacific's contribution claim was originally dismissed because the railroad's
negligence was considered active, barring contribution under the old criteria. Id. at 468. On re-
mand, the trial court found that Missouri Pacific's relative fault was 25% and that Whitehead &
Kales's relative fault was 75%. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., No. 73681 (Jack-
son County Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 1981).
27. E.g., Union Elec. Co. v. Magary, 373 S.W.2d 16, 21 (Mo. 1963); Johnson v. California
Spray-Chem. Co., 362 S.W.2d 630, 634 (Mo. 1962); Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799, 807-
08 (Mo. 1961) (en bane); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Payway Feed Mills, 338 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. 1960);
Bratton v. Sharp Enters., 552 S.W.2d 306, 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Fields v. Berry, 549 S.W.2d
122, 127-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Hays-Fendler Constr. Co. v. Traroloc Inv. Co., 521 S.W.2d
171, 176-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Lewis v. Amchem Prods., 510 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974).
28. Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d at 471. Active or passive negligence was never deter-
mined with any consistency; an act could be deemed either depending upon how it was character-
ized. Whitehead & Kales gave as examples: "'driving an automobile with bad brakes' or 'running
through the stop sign' or 'using a defective crane' might be said to be 'active' negligence, while
'omitting maintenance of brake fluid level' or 'neglecting to apply the brakes' or 'failing to inspect
the crane in order to discover its defectiveness' might be 'passive' negligence." Id.
29. Id. at 470-72.
30. Id. at 472.
31. Id. at 474. Whitehead & Kales overruled State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo.
15, 213 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1948) (en bane) (allowed the plaintiff in the original action to exclude a
third-party defendant from the suit). Safeway, 633 S.W.2d at 733 (Welliver, J., concurring).
32. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 475 F. Supp. 679, 680-81 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Roth
v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); notes 33-37 and accompanying text infra.
33. Forty-two states and the District of Columbia permit contribution. Kutner, Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors: The Effect of Statutes of Limitations and Other Time Limitations, 33
OKLA. L. REV. 203, 269-71 (1980). Twenty of these 43 jurisdictions have adopted the UNIF.
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT (1939) (revised 1955), 12 U.L.A. 63-107 (1975) & 58
(Supp. 1983) (provides for a separate contribution action) [hereinafter cited as UCATA]. Juris-
dictions that have not adopted the Act often judicially provide for separate actions. E.g., State
3
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and substantive right to contribution through impleader 3 4 The Safeway court
reasoned that some substantive right must exist before impleader is allowed.3 5
Since Whitehead & Kales granted the procedural right to impleader for con-
tribution claims, it necessarily established a substantive right to contribution
outside the statute.8 6 The court further stated that a substantive cause of ac-
tion can be asserted independently."7
The Safeway court acknowledged the conflict between its holding and the
contribution statute.38 Missouri Revised Statutes section 537.06039 grants con-
tribution rights to "[diefendants in a judgment. '40 The courts had interpreted
this phrase to require a judgment of joint liability before allowing contribu-
tion.4 1 Whitehead & Kales attacked this limitation as "inartful and capri-
cious, ' 42 and Safeway construed the criticism as authorization for creating a
separate contribution action.43
'The reasoning employed in Safeway may be inconsistent with Missouri
case law. An earlier Missouri decision stated that providing a right to im-
pleader, as done in Whitehead & Kales, did not change substantive law be-
cause the right of contribution between joint tortfeasors accrues only upon
joint judgment. 44
The respondents in Safeway, who were not parties to the original action,
contended that a separate contribution action would violate their procedural
due process rights.4 5 The court did not find this argument persuasive. The lia-
bility of a non-party defendant is not determined by the original action; thus,
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Schara, 56 Wis. 2d 262, 263, 201 N.W.2d 758, 759 (1972).
34. Safeway, 633 S.W.2d at 731; see 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
14.0311] (1982).
35. The reasoning is that Rule 14 does not
'abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.' It creates no sub-
stantive rights. Thus unless there is some substantive basis for the third-party plaintiff's
claim he cannot utilize the procedure of Rule 14. The Rule does not establish a right of
reimbursement, indemnity, nor contribution; but where there is a basis for such right,
Rule 14 expedites the presentation, and in some cases accelerates the accrual of such
right.
3 J. MooRE, supra note 34, % 14.0311] (footnotes omitted); see 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1448, at 264-65 (1971).
36. Safeway, 633 S.W.2d at 731.
37. Id.; see Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 475 F. Supp. 679, 680-81 (E.D. Mo. 1979)
(Whitehead & Kales created a new substantive cause of action, implying that indemnity may be
sought in a separate suit).
38. The courts have strictly adhered to the statute's requirement of a joint judgment. See,
e.g., Allen v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 992, 1009 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Layman v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
558 S.W.2d 220, 225 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
39. (1978) (repealed 1983).
40. See also UCATA § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975) (releases and covenants not to sue).
41. Allen v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 992, 1009 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Crouch v. Tourtelot,
370 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Mo. 1961) (en bane); State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 22,
213 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Mo. 1948) (en banc).
42. 566 S.W.2d at 473.
43. 633 S.W.2d at 731.
44. State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 22, 213 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Mo. 1948)(en bane).
45. 633 S.W.2d at 732.
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due process rights are not endangered by an independent contribution action.46
Contribution defendants retain the right to discover and present evidence,
cross-examine witnesses, and use any defense that would have been available
in the original action.47 The Safeway court cited Sattelberger v. Telep,48 in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a subsequent contribution ac-
tion did not violate the defendant's right to procedural due process. The Sat-
telberger court held that the right to seek contribution is substantive; there-
fore, it is enforced and protected by the rules of court.4* These rules protect
due process rights, including the rights of joint tortfeasors.50
The Missouri Supreme Court in Safeway referred to Whitehead & Kales
to justify creating an independent contribution action. Whitehead & Kales,
however, demonstrated reluctance to establish an independent action. The su-
preme court in Whitehead & Kales seemed to purposely avoid any conflict
with the Missouri contribution statute.51 Because the statute mentioned only
judgment defendants, the court concluded that it must only bind defendants
against whom a judgment has been rendered. Whitehead & Kales interpreted
the statutory requirement to exclude pre-judgment proceedings; 5 Safeway ex-
tended this analysis to create a post-judgment action.53
In Rudolph v. Mundy," the Arkansas Supreme Court faced a situa-
tion similar to Safeway. Arkansas's statute referred to "joint judgment
debtor[s], ' 55 and provided that if a party could obtain relief by third party
practice, "no independent action shall be maintained to enforce the claim for
46. Id.; see also Sattelberger v. Telep, 14 N.J. 353, 365, 102 A.2d 577, 583 (1954). Sepa-
rate actions may present res judicata and collateral estoppel problems. Comment, supra note 18,
at 704 & n.68. Nevertheless, courts have consistently held that an action is not barred by res
judicata or collateral estoppel unless the defendant was found to be faultless in the original action.
Due process is satisfied if the defendant has a full and fair opportunity to defend on the merits.
E.g., Shimp v. Sederstrom, 305 Minn. 273, 276, 233 N.W.2d 292, 295 (1975).
47. 633 S.W.2d at 732.
48. 14 N.J. 353, 102 A.2d 577 (1954).
49. Id. at 365, 102 A.2d at 583.
50. Id.
The right to sue for contribution does not depend upon a prior determination that the
defendants are liable. Whether they are liable is the matter to be decided in the suit. To
recover, a plaintiff must prove both that there was a common burden of debt and that
he has, as between himself and the defendants, paid more than his fair share of the
common obligation. Every defendant may, of course, set up any defense personal to
him.
Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233, 236 (1937).
51. 566 S.W.2d at 473-74 (statute does not apply to proceedings prior to judgment); see
also Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 475 F. Supp. 679, 681 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (Whitehead &
Kales implies that separate suit may be brought); Parks v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d 188,
196 (Mo. 1980) (Welliver, J., dissenting) (no sound reason why liability issue should not be de-
cided by a jury prior to judgment). But cf Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d at 474 n.8 (problems
with separate trials).
52. 566 S.W.2d at 473.
53. 633 S.W.2d at 732.
54. 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602 (1956). Arkansas has since adopted the UCATA. See
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (1962).
55. 1941 Ark. Acts 315 ("[C]ontribution [is allowed] against any other joint judgment
debtor, where in a single action a judgment has been entered.").
5
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contribution. '50 Nevertheless, in dicta the court authorized a separate action
for contribution.57
In Rudolph, three suits arising out of a three-car accident were consoli-
dated. Rudolph's cross-claim against Mundy for contribution was dismissed by
the trial court.58 On appeal, the supreme court upheld the dismissal because
impleader was permissive rather than mandatory.59 The court suggested, how-
ever, that *a plaintiff denied permissive impleader may not be precluded from
seeking contribution in a separate action.60
The contribution right recognized in Safeway also may be analogous to
the right to obtain contribution in a separate action following settlement. This
right is recognized in most jurisdictions, including Missouri.61 In Stephenson
v. McClure,8 the Missouri Court of Appeals applied Whitehead & Kales to
settlements and concluded that the lack of a prior judgment for the plaintiff
did not prejudice the co-tortfeasor's right to contribution.63 The problem with
this analogy is that settlement is a prejudgment remedy and thus falls within
the language of Whitehead & Kales. Nevertheless, the analogy is relevant on a
policy level: settlements often are reached at trial during jury deliberations.
Therefore, the problems of relitigating issues and wasting court time exist in
both situations.
Safeway's recognition of a separate cause of action for contribution
presents significant problems. Although the judgment in Safeway occurred
before Whitehead & Kales was decided, the parties did not contest its retroac-
tive application." Missouri applies a "procedure-substance" test to determine
the effect of an overruling decision. 5 The mechanisms for carrying on the suit
are classified as procedural; the rights and duties that give rise to the cause of
action are substantive."8 If the decision overruled involves substantive law, it is
applied retroactively.67 Whitehead & Kales affected apportionment of liability
56. Id. The statute has been superceded by ARK. R. Civ. P. 18: "Whenever a claim is one
heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims
may be joined in a single action."
57. 226 Ark. at 99, 288 S.W.2d at 604-05 (right to contribution through impleader is
permissive and does not preclude separate contribution suit).
58. Id. at 99, 288 S.W.2d at 604.
59. Id., 288 S.W.2d at 604-05. Missouri's impleader rule is permissive. See note 22 supra.
60. 226 Ark. at 99, 288 S.W.2d at 605. Safeway used the same argument. See 633 S.W.2d
at 731.
61. See Stephenson v. McClure, 606 S.W.2d 208, 212 n.10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Com-
ment, supra note 18, at 715.
62. 606 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
63. Id. at 212.
64. Safeway, 633 S.W.2d at 728 n.l.
65. Shepherd v. Consumers Coop. Ass'n, 384 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo. 1964) (en banc);
Moore v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 329 S.W.2d 14, 24 (Mo. 1959); Barker v. St. Louis County,
340 Mo. 986, 996, 104 S.W.2d 371, 377 (1937); Koebel v. Tieman Coal & Material Co., 337 Mo.
561, 570-72, 85 S.W.2d 519, 524-25 (1935); Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659, 672 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978).
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and rights of recovery; hence, Missouri courts have classed it as substantive 8
and apply it retroactively.69 If Whitehead & Kales authorized a separate ac-
tion for contribution, as Safeway reasoned, the right to bring an independent
contribution action may also be retroactive. To the extent it enlarges contribu-
tion rights beyond pre-judgment liability, Safeway may have implicitly over-
ruled 0 Whitehead & Kales.71 If so, Safeway may be retroactive.
Whether Whitehead & Kales authorized an independent contribution ac-
tion or Safeway is retroactive, granting retroactive status remains problematic.
A court that overrules a decision has the discretion, even in cases involving
substantive changes in law, to determine the new law's retroactive effect.72
When the court remains silent on retroactivity, the overruling decision is gen-
erally assumed to be retroactive.7 3 Whitehead & Kales and Safeway did not
discuss retroactivity; therefore, they normally would be retroactive to the ex-
tent that they overruled prior law. Nevertheless, a court may deny or limit a
decision's retroactive effect to special circumstances. 4 The scope of retroactiv-
ity may be limited to the parties in the overruling decision, applied to transac-
tions occurring before the decision, expanded to pending judgments, or encom-
pass final judgments.7 5 If Missouri courts decide that the right to independent
post-judgment contribution dates back to Whitehead & Kales, suits tried years
prior to Safeway mhy reappear on dockets as co-tortfeasors demand contribu-
tion rights.
The Safeway court acknowledged the general five-year statute of limita-
tions for contribution actions,7 6 but the court suggested that the legislature
shorten the statutory period if five years proves too long.77 In Missouri, the
statute of limitations for contribution actions does not run until a joint
tortfeasor pays more than his proportionate share after judgment or settle-
ment.7 8 Contribution proceedings may commence years after the statute of
limitations on the original plaintiff's action has run.79 As a result, the contri-
68. See note 32 supra.
69. Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
70. See note 51 supra.
71. See Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129, 132 (1888) (precedent may be overruled by
implication).
72. Dietz v. Humphreys, 507 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Mo. 1974); Barker v. St. Louis County,
340 Mo. 986, 999, 104 S.W.2d 371, 379 (1937).
73. See Burns v. Owens, 459 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. 1970).
74. See Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599, 606 (Mo. 1969) (en bane);
Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 347, 251 S.W.2d 42, 46 (1952); Klocke v. Klocke, 276 Mo.
572, 582, 208 S.W. 825, 827 (1919) (en bane).
75. See Dietz v. Humphreys, 507 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Mo. 1974); Shepherd v. Consumers
Coop. Ass'n, 384 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo. 1964) (en bane); Lober v. Kansas City, 74 S.W.2d 815,
825 (Mo. 1934).
76. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120(1) (1978) (five-year limitation for "[a]ll actions upon con-
tracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied").
77. See 633 S.W.2d at 732, 733.
78. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 475 F. Supp. 679, 681 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Simon v.
Kansas City Rug Co., 460 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. 1970).
79. If the original plaintiff settles with tortfeasor A and does not settle with or sue
tortfeasor B before the statute of limitations has run, the plaintiff no longer has a right to bring an
19841
7
Myers: Myers: Separate Cause of Action for Contribution
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
bution defendant, not a party to the original action, may be severely disadvan-
taged when confronted with a delayed contribution claim. Parties to the origi-
nal suit and witnesses may forget or be unavailable, and evidence may be
lost.80 Safeway recognized that an extended statutory period may present diffi-
culties. Because no excessive delay had occurred in Safeway,82 the court did
not address the problem except to recommend legislative action if necessary.82
Courts that interpret Safeway also may be faced with the use of defensive
collateral estoppel. In Oates v. Safeco Insurance Co.,83 the Missouri Supreme
Court recognized the right to non-mutual defensive collateral estoppel. Oates
replaced the mutuality requirement with the Bernhard doctrine.8' Bernhard
allows a defendant who was not a party to the initial action to raise collateral
estoppel if: (1) the issues in both actions are identical; (2) the first suit was
decided on the merits; and (3) the party to be estopped was a party or in
privity with a party to the first lawsuit.8 5 Oates added a fourth requirement:
the party to be estopped must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the original lawsuit.8 8 The Bernhard doctrine requires a case-by-
case analysis; fairness is the overriding consideration.7
Missouri's adoption of the Bernhard doctrine may predetermine the issue
of liability in independent actions for contribution. If the party asserting de-
fensive collateral estoppel meets the requirements, the contribution plaintiff
may be foreclosed from relitigating issues decided in the original suit. This
estoppel problem might arise regarding liability. Percentages of liability may
become difficult to ascertain in the subsequent contribution lawsuit. In the
original suit the court may find tortfeasor A 60% liable and tortfeasor B 40%
liable. If only tortfeasor A seeks contribution from tortfeasor C, who was not a
party to the original action, apportionment may require relitigating the entire
issue of liability. 88 The Bernhard doctrine may foreclose relitigation of liabil-
ity; therefore, a party seeking contribution would be collaterally estopped from
obtaining contribution in a separate action.
action against B. A may, however, bring a contribution action against B because the statute of
limitations for contribution does not begin to run until A has paid his proportionate share of
liability to the original plaintiff. Settling tortfeasors and those sued by the victim may commence
contribution actions even after the victim's action is barred. See Kutner, supra note 33, at 236-37.
80. See Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d at 474 n.8; Kutner, supra note 33, at 235; Com-
ment, supra note 18, at 707.
81. The contribution suit in Safeway was filed within three years and one month of the
accident. 633 S.W.2d at 732.
82. Id.
83. 583 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1979) (en bane).
84. Id. at 719; see Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807,
122 P.2d 892 (1942). The mutuality doctrine required that the person asserting collateral estoppel
and the person to be collaterally estopped both be parties to the original suit.
85. Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
86. 583 S.W.2d at 719; see Jones v. Corcoran, 625 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
87. Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co., 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. 1979) (en bane).
88. This also presents complications concerning B. What if B later seeks contribution from
C? What if C, after A's judgment against him, seeks contribution against B? Can this be remedied
by making B a necessary or proper party to A's contribution claim against C? These questions
have not been answered.
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Oates concluded that Bernhard should not be applied if it would result in
unfairness to the defendant.89 It would be inequitable to bind a tortfeasor to a
percentage of liability that should be shared by a co-tortfeasor, not a party to
the original lawsuit, merely because the percentages determined are perma-
nent. Although tortfeasor C should be impleaded into the original action, pe-
nalizing a party for failing to implead under permissive impleader rules is
inequitable.90
The impact of Safeway on contribution actions in Missouri will depend
upon how broadly it is construed. The timing of the decision supports a strict
interpretation of Safeway and adoption of a case-by-case analysis. The origi-
nal action in Safeway was decided prior to the decision in Whitehead & Kales,
but the contribution claim was filed after Whitehead & Kales.91 The Safeway
court considered the problems caused by the timing of the suit and found it
inherently unfair to deny contribution because Safeway failed to use a proce-
dural device, impleader, not recognized for contribution claims in Missouri
when Safeway could have used it.92
The court also indicated that the facts of the case should determine the
right to contribution.9 3 In its conclusion, the court stated that it was not indi-
cating a preference for separate actions.94 The court reiterated the purposes of
impleader,95 thereby arguably supporting a case-by-case determination of
whether impleader or a separate action should be allowed for contribution.
One purpose of impleader is avoiding duplication of time and effort. If
two disputes involve the same facts, evidence, parties or issues, it is more effi-
cient to try them in one lawsuit. The same is true for cost; doubling the court
costs or the attorney's fees is needless when the rights of all parties could be
litigated effectively in one trial. Impleader also avoids the detrimental effect of
delay between judgments. Passage of time between the original action and a
separate contribution action may result in loss of evidence, fading memories,
or unavailability of witnesses and parties. Those problems do not occur when
the decisions are made simultaneously under impleader. Much of this lan-
89. 583 S.W.2d at 719.
90. Safeway's independent contribution action may alleviate some of the difficulties cre-
ated by Whitehead & Kales, which required joint tortfeasors to implead and bring their contribu-
tion actions in the plaintiff's original suit. If D. had a personal injury claim against D, a court
would deny recovery to D, if D. was found even 1% negligent, based upon the doctrine of contrib-
utory negligence. See Jones v. Corcoran, 625 S.W.2d 173, 175 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). But cf.
notes 121-23 and accompanying text infra (Missouri recently adopted a pure comparative fault
system).
91. 633 S.W.2d at 728-29.
92. Id. at 732. This statement must be considered a change in substantive law if it is to be
applied retrospectively in Missouri. Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); see
notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra. State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 213
S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1948) (en banc), giving the plaintiff the right to deny third-party practice, may
have influenced Safeway's decision not to attempt impleader in the original action. Whitehead &
Kales alleviated this dilemma. See note 31 supra.
93. 633 S.W.2d at 729.
94. Id. at 732; see 3 J. MOORE, supra note 34, § 14.04.
95. 633 S.W.2d at 732; see also Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.11.
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guage in Safeway supports a case-by-case analysis to determine the right to a
separate action for contribution. If interpreted narrowly, Safeway may cause
only minimal changes in Missouri contribution law.
On the other hand, Missouri courts may construe Safeway broadly. The
holding in Safeway authorizes a separate contribution action, and any lan-
guage limiting that holding is dicta. The court granted a separate cause of
action for contribution based in part upon the permissive nature of im-
pleader.17 Once Whitehead & Kales gave the contribution plaintiff impleader
rights, a substantive right to contribution logically followed, according to
Safeway.98 A party seeking contribution may exercise that substantive right
either through impleader or a separate action. The Safeway court's analysis
indicates no intention to limit that substantive right to contribution.
If Safeway is construed broadly, Missouri courts may face contribution
claims from judgments rendered a decade ago. The five-year statute of limi-
tations applied in Safeway 00 would not begin to run until one tortfeasor has
paid more than his proportionate share. A defendant could pay his proportion-
ate share of the judgment over a span of many years, and the statutory period
would not begin until more than the proportionate share has been paid. The
original defendant, the plaintiff in the contribution action, could then wait al-
most five years to bring the contribution action. Courts would risk litigating
stale claims, arriving at inconsistent verdicts,101 and violating due process
requirements.102
Judge Welliver, concurring in Safeway, suggested that the problems
caused by a separate action for contribution may be remedied by making Mis-
souri's impleader rule mandatory.10 This solution responds to the majority's
contention that a separate contribution action must be allowed because im-
pleader is permissive.'" Mandatory impleader would require a tortfeasor to
implead all tortfeasors into the original action or be foreclosed from seeking
contribution at a later date.105 According to Judge Welliver, mandatory im-
96. 633 S.W.2d at 731.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra (retroactive effect of Whitehead &
Kales). If the plaintiff obtains a judgment of $152,000 (as in Safeway) and the defendant pays
$500 a month and considers half of the judgment his proportionate share, the statute of limita-
tions on his contribution claim would not commence until 13 years after the original judgment.
The joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought might not learn of the contribution action
until 18 years after the original action.
100. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120(1) (1978).
101. Separate contribution actions raise the question of whether finding D, 60% liable and
D. 40% liable in one contribution action precludes them from seeking contribution from D. in
another action. If not, reapportioning liability at 33'h% would result in an inconsistent verdict.
The same problem would occur if D1 or D, individually seek contribution from D'.
102. See 633 S.W.2d at 733 (Welliver, J., concurring); Comment, supra note 18, at 707.
103. 633 S.W.2d at 733 (Welliver, J., concurring).
104. Id.
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pleader would ensure due process, judicial economy, consistent verdicts, and
fairness.108
Mandatory impleader presents special problems. A defendant may be un-
able to complete services of process, obtain proper venue, or get jurisdiction
over a tortfeasor due to the forum chosen by the plaintiff. In that instance, the
co-tortfeasor could not be made a party in the original action, and the original
defendant would be denied contribution. When information is incomplete at
discovery, the defendant may be unable to ascertain all potentially liable par-
ties in time to attempt to implead them and be fully prepared to litigate.
Adding parties to a lawsuit will increase complexities at trial and may
confuse the jury. A defendant may not want to implead a third party into the
original suit. Jurors may perceive a trial involving several defendants as a way
to spread the effect of a verdict for the plaintiff among the defendants and
thus shift the emphasis from whether the defendant is liable to the amount for
which each defendant should be liable. Sympathy for the plaintiff may become
even stronger if a jury views the defendants as "ganging up" against the lone
plaintiff. Although judges have the discretion to sever claims for separate tri-
als,107 mandatory impleader would preclude them from doing so. On the sur-
face, mandatory impleader seems to be a viable alternative to allowing inde-
pendent contribution actions. The many drawbacks, however, make mandatory
impleader undesirable."0 8
The negative effects of independent contribution actions could be reduced
by shortening the statute of limitations. Some commentators have suggested
that the limitations statute for contribution claims should run concurrently
with the limitation placed on the tort action.10 9 Such a rule, however, would
create mandatory impleader for contribution claims where the original plain-
tiff delayed bringing suit.110 A one-year statutory period for contribution ac-
tions proposed in section 3(c) of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act avoids that inequity."1 The period does not accrue until a defendant has
paid more than his pro-rata share of liability. 2 Safeway suggested that Mis-
souri adopt the one-year statute of limitations. 1"
106. 633 S.W.2d at 733 (Welliver, J., concurring).
107. Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.11(a), 66.02.
108. No state seems to require impleader, but see the statutes listed in note 119 infra (pre-
clude independent action if contribution can be achieved through third-party practice).
109. See Kutner, supra note 33, at 246.
110. Concurrent statutes of limitations would make impleader mandatory if the original
plaintiff files at the end of the statutory period. It would not have the same effect when the
original plaintiff files at the beginning or middle of the statutory period. In the latter instance, the
defendant may have time to file a separate claim for contribution.
111. The separate action must commence within one year after judgment has become final
by lapse of time for appeal. UCATA § 3(c), 12 U.L.A. 88 (1975). Besides short-cutting attempts
to prolong the time for asserting a right to contribution, a one-year period would alleviate
problems in determining when a tortfeasor has paid more than his proportionate share.
112. See UCATA § l(b), 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975).
113. 633 S.W.2d at 733 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schara, 56 Wis. 2d 262,
268, 201 N.W.2d 758, 761 (1972) (six-year statutory period)); see Wis. STAT. § 893.19(3)
(1965). Wisconsin now has a one-year statute of limitations for tort contribution actions. Id.
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The difficulties that result from allowing a separate cause of action for
contribution are surmountable. A three-point plan will alleviate most of the
problems arising from Safeway. First, the legislature should enact a one-year
statute of limitations for independent contribution actions, accruing after the
judgment is final by lapse of time for appeal or after final disposition of the
appeal of the original plaintiff's action. A one-year statutory period was sug-
gested in Safeway114 and is implemented in many states that recognize sepa-
rate contribution actions. 1 5 The one-year limitation would allow the contribu-
tion plaintiff reasonable time to identify the contribution defendants.
Requiring that the separate action commence within one year after final judg-
ment also avoids the current requirement of determining when a tortfeasor has
paid more than his proportionate share 16 and precludes any attempt to use
that requirement to prolong the period within which a right to contribution
may be asserted. The shorter statutory period would help to ensure that wit-
nesses and evidence would not be lost. The prevailing view is that the right to
contribution accrues when the original judgment is final.217
Second, the legislature should enact a statute providing discretionary im-
pleader for contribution, granting courts the discretion to decide if a separate
action for contribution is necessary, and requiring the courts to make that
determination based upon the doctrine of fairness. This provision would mini-
mize relitigation of issues in separate contribution actions. The trial court
would have the discretion to decide whether contribution should be sought
through impleader in the original action or in an independent contribution ac-
tion. Basing that determination upon the doctrine of fairness 18 protects the
defendant from difficulties that would arise if impleader were mandatory and
at the same time achieves most of the important benefits of mandatory
impleader.119
§ 893.92 (1979).
114. 633 S.W.2d at 732-33.
115. UCATA § 3(a), 12 U.L.A. 58 (Supp. 1983); see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
231B, § 3(c) (West Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.285(3) (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
38-03(3) (1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(B) (Page 1981); WYO. STAT. § 1-1-112(c)
(1982).
116. Missouri currently requires that the tortfeasor pay more than his proportionate share
before the statute of limitations commences. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
117. Kutner, supra note 33, at 208 n.25; see, e.g., Evans v. Lukas, 140 Ga. App. 182, 184,
230 S.E.2d 136, 138 (1976); McGlone v. Corbi, 59 N.J. 86, 95, 279 A.2d 812, 817 (1971); Winn
v. Peter Bratti Ass'n, Inc., 80 Misc. 2d 756, 759, 364 N.Y.S.2d 137, 140 (Sup. Ct. 1975); God-
frey v. Tidewater Power Co., 223 N.C. 647, 649, 27 S.E.2d 736, 737-38 (1943); Swartz v. Sun-
derland, 192 Pa. Super. 466, 468-69, 162 A.2d 91, 92 (1960), revd, 403 Pa. 222, 169 A.2d 289
(1961); Wnek v. Boyle, 172 Pa. Super. 222, 224, 92 A.2d 701, 702 (1952).
118. Fairness should be determined by looking at: the availability of information to the
defendant; the opportunity to get venue, service of process, or jurisdiction over the joint tortfeasor;
prejudice due to the number of co-defendants; multiplicity of lawsuits; and efficiency.
119. Discretionary impleader would encourage judicial economy, accelerating disposition
and decreasing legal expenses. Unlike mandatory impleader, discretionary impleader avoids
prejudice to the parties and ensures fairness. Some states statutes preclude independent actions if
contribution can be obtained through third-party practice; however, they allow separate contribu-
tion actions if the defendant failed to complete service of process on the joint tortfeasor in the
original action. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1007(3) (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
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Finally, the courts should use a case-by-case analysis to determine the
equities involved in requiring impleader for contribution. Potential contribu-
tion plaintiffs should be guaranteed an individualized assessment before im-
pleader is required. 120 Impleader should only be required if no prejudice re-
sults to any party. If prejudice would result, a separate contribution action
should be granted.
Safeway is a beneficial change in Missouri contribution law. A defendant
should not be required to implead every potential tortfeasor when procedural,
evidentiary, or tactical considerations prevent him from doing so. A separate
contribution action should also be available when it would be equitable. This
plan retains the benefits from Safeway, minimizing its drawbacks.
Safeway extended the principles underlying Whitehead & Kales to allow
the determination of relative or comparative fault among tortfeasors in sepa-
rate and subsequent actions. Recently, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted a
comprehensive system of comparative fault. In Gustafson v. Benda,121 the
court held: "Insofar as possible this and future cases shall apply the doctrine
of pure comparative fault in accordance with the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act §§ 1-6, 12 U.L.A. Supp. 34-45 (1983) .... "-12 The decision will have a
monumental impact on the prosecution of tort actions in Missouri, including
contribution and indemnity claims.
To the extent that it is "possible" to follow them, provisions of the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act (Act) address some of the uncertainties created
by Safeway. The key provision is section 4(a):
A right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who
are jointly and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same
injury, death, or harm, whether or not judgment has been recovered against
all or any of them. It may be enforced in the original action or by a separate
action brought for that purpose. The basis for contribution is each person's
equitable share of the obligation, including the equitable share of a claimant
at fault, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.123
The Act provides for a one-year statute of limitations on contribution claims.
If a judgment has been rendered, the contribution action must be commenced
within one year after the judgment becomes final.12' If no judgment is ren-
dered, two variations arise. A party may discharge by payment the common
liability within the period of limitation applicable to the claimant's right of
§ 6306(b) (1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-17(b) (1976).
120. While this may increase processing time and costs, it will still reduce time and cost
compared to allowing the defendant to bring a separate contribution action whenever he wishes.
121. 661 S.W.2d 11 (1983) (en banc).
122. Id. at 15-16. The court appended a copy of the Act and accompanying comments to its
opinion. Id. app. A. Missouri is the first jurisdiction to judicially adopt the Act. See 12 U.L.A. 34
(Supp. 1983). Gustafson will apply only to cases filed after January 31, 1984. See 661 S.W.2d at
15.
123. 12 U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 1983). Although each defendant is jointly and severally liable to
the plaintiff for the whole amount of damages, defendants are liable as between each other based
on their equitable fault shares. Id. comment.
124. § 5(c), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1983).
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action against him. A contribution action based on this discharge must be
brought within one year after payment. Alternatively, a party may agree while
a lawsuit is pending to discharge the common liability. If so, he has one year
to pay the liability and commence an action for contribution. 12 5
For the most part, the judicial adoption of the Act reverses only common
law developments. In the area of releases, however, the Act impacts on a stat-
ute recently changed by the legislature, Missouri Revised Statutes section
537.060.126 This section provides that a tortfeasor who obtains a release from
the claimant is insulated from the contribution claims of joint tortfeasors. 27
Under section 6 of the Act, however, a release does not protect a tortfeasor
against contribution claims. 2 8 The court recognized this inconsistency in Gus-
tafson and stated in dicta that section 537.060 controls. 29
From Whitehead & Kales to Safeway and Gustafson, the Missouri Su-
preme Court has made significant progress in reforming antiquated common
law tort concepts. Although these advances yield transient uncertainties, ulti-
mately they will streamline tort litigation for parties, attorneys, and judges.'2 0
GRETCHEN H. MYERS
125. Id. Compare text accompanying notes 76-77 supra (Safeway court recognized that
five-year statute of limitations applies to contribution actions). Following Gustafson, it is unclear
whether the Act or the dicta in Safeway will control.
126. (Supp. 1983); see 1983 Mo. Legis. Serv. 398-99 (Vernon); Fischer, The New Settle-
ment Statute: Its History and Effect, 40 J. Mo. B. 13 (1984).
127. Id. ("[The] agreement shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liabil-
ity for contribution or non-contractual indemnity to any other tortfeasor."). The statute is
modeled after § 4(a) of the UCATA. See 12 U.L.A. 63, 98 (1975).
128. 12 U.L.A. 44 (Supp. 1983); see generally Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under
Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343, 368-71 (1981).
129. 661 S.W.2d at 15-16 n.10. The original opinion did not contain this footnote. Gustaf-
son v. Benda, No. 63857, slip op. at 8 (Mo. Nov. 22, 1983) (en banc).
130. See Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 15.
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